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GREAT BRITAIN 
 
Court of Appeal 
 
Yapp v Foreign & Commonwealth Office 
 
Employment Contracts - Breach of Contract – Psychiatric Injury – Duty of Care 
 
HEADNOTES 
 
Facts 
 
The facts and appellate history of this case were set out in paras 13 - 57 of the 
judgment of Underhill LJ, and can be summarised as follows. 
 
In January 2007 the Claimant (Y) in these proceedings was appointed British High 
Commissioner in Belize, taking up the post in August that year. On 13 June 2008, 
following a series of allegations informally made against him to his superiors by a 
former member of the Belizean Government, now in opposition, he was withdrawn 
from that post on "operational" grounds with immediate effect and suspended pending 
investigation. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office ("FCO")'s disciplinary 
procedures were implemented. An initial fact finding investigation concluded ‘that 
there were two cases of misconduct to answer: (1) "that [the Claimant] behaved 
inappropriately towards […] women on public social occasions and thus brought 
HMG into disrepute"; and (2) "that he bullied and harassed High Commission staff"’ 
(paragraph 32).  
 
Charges based on those findings were formally put to the Claimant on 24 July 2008. 
He was informed that if they were substantiated they would constitute level 2 
misconduct. He was given a copy of the report and asked to attend a formal 
disciplinary interview with the same FCO official that had led the preliminary fact 
finding investigation on 7 August. While those charges were pending news of the 
Claimant's withdrawal as High Commissioner to Belize appeared in the British media, 
with articles published in the Mail on Sunday and The Daily Telegraph on 27 and 28 
July 2008 respectively. The essence of the story was that the Claimant had behaved 
inappropriately towards women at official functions. 
 
The disciplinary hearing took place on 7 August 2008 and found that the allegations 
of inappropriate behaviour towards women had not been established but that those of 
bullying the members of the staff had been. The Claimant was given a final written 
warning and there would be a recommendation that he should not be given another 
appointment as head of mission. The Claimant made some representations about 
penalty, and when the chair of the disciplinary hearing wrote on 11 August to confirm 
the outcome he said that the warning would only last for one year and that he had 
made no recommendation against a further posting as head of mission. The Claimant 
appealed but following a hearing on 3 October 2008 before a different senior FCO 
official, the appeal was dismissed. 
 
Following the conclusion of the disciplinary process, Y’s suspension was lifted but in 
the meantime he had developed a depressive illness, and also had to undergo heart 
surgery, and he did not in fact receive any other appointment in the FCO until his 
retirement when he reached the age of 60 in January 2011. On 16 May 2011 the 
Claimant commenced proceedings against the FCO complaining both of his 
withdrawal from the post of High Commissioner and of the way in which the 
disciplinary process was conducted and its outcome. He said that the resulting stress 
had caused his depressive illness, which both constituted damage in itself and led, on 
account of his inability to return to work, to pecuniary loss over and above the loss of 
his enhanced earnings and allowances as High Commissioner.  
 
Y pursued his claims in contact before the High Court, who found in his favour in 
Yapp v Foreign and Commonwealth Office, [2013] EWHC 1098 (QB) and concluded 
that the FCO acted in breach of contract and in breach of its duty of care to Y in 
withdrawing him from his post as High Commissioner without first assessing the 
veracity of the allegations made and discussing them with him. The FCO argument 
that Y could not recover damages for his psychiatric injury because of remoteness 
were rejected by the High Court as,  per  Gogay v Hertfordshire Council [2000] IRLR 
703, it could reasonably be contemplated that depression would have been a not 
unlikely result of a knee-jerk withdrawal from the post (para 137 of the HC decision). 
The FCO appealed.  
 
Decision 
 
The appeal was allowed in part. The CA allowed the FCO’s appeal on the issue of 
remoteness of the claim for psychiatric injury in both tort and contract, but dismissed 
the one against the findings of breach of contract and causation, Underhill LJ 
expressly opining at para. 133 of his judgment that 
 
“the losses attributable to the Claimant's psychiatric injury were not 
reasonably foreseeable and cannot accordingly found a claim for breach of the 
common law duty of care. It follows that they are also too remote to be 
recoverable in his claim for breach of contract, where the test of remoteness is 
more favourable to defendants. I would allow the FCO's appeal to that extent 
and remit the case to the High Court to decide quantum if the parties are 
unable to agree” 
 
In paragraph 129 of the CA judgment, Underhill LJ narrowed down the relevance of 
Gogey holding that in that case ‘this Court did no more than decline to interfere with 
the conclusion of the judge. We do not know on what basis that conclusion was 
established: in particular, there is no reason to suppose that it was not a case of known 
psychiatric vulnerability, and some reason to believe that it may have been’. 
 
Law Applied 
 
The claim and the appeal were brought in respect of breaches of express and implied 
terms of Y’s contract of employment and also as claims in tort. More specifically in 
respect of the failure to operate the FCO’s procedures in compliance with the implied 
term of mutual trust and confidence and the duty of care. These are two areas of 
English employment law that are predominantly, if not exclusively, shaped by 
common law precedents.  
 
In paragraph 42 of his judgment Underhill LJ summarises the key precedents 
informing this are of English employment law in the following terms 
 
“As to that, and at the risk of spelling out the obvious: 
(1) The "implied term of mutual trust and confidence" is the term 
authoritatively established by the decision of the House of Lords in Malik v 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1998] AC 20. Lord Nicholls, 
at p. 34A, defined the term as being that the employer "would not, without 
reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner likely to destroy or 
seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer 
and employee."[1] I will refer to this for convenience as "the Malik term". 
(2) The "duty of care" to which the Judge refers is of course the so-called 
"common law duty of care" which every employer owes to his employees to 
take reasonable care for their safety. At para. 103 of his judgment the Judge 
sets out the classic exposition by Swanwick J in Stokes v Guest Keen and 
Nettlefold (Bolts and Nuts) Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 1776, at p. 1783, but I need not 
repeat it here. The duty tends to be regarded as primarily arising in tort, and in 
the discussion below I will generally refer to it as such; but it is well 
established, as the Judge noted, that it arises equally in contract – see 
Matthews v Kuwait Bechtel Corp [1959] QB 59.” 
 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
Underhill LJ, with whom Davis LJ and Patten LJ agreed, delivered the following 
judgment. 
 
 
(A) THE FCO's APPEAL 
58. I take first the FCO's challenge to the Judge's finding that its treatment of the 
Claimant was unfair, to which I will refer for convenience as his finding of 
breach. I will then take in turn the issues of causation and remoteness of loss. 
This classification is strictly inaccurate as regards the common law duty of 
care because if the risk of psychiatric injury is too remote no duty to take steps 
to avoid it will arise, and there can thus be no question of breach; but that 
refinement can be ignored for present purposes. 
(1) BREACH 
The Withdrawal Decision 
59. The pleaded ground of appeal is that the Judge applied the wrong test to the 
question whether the FCO's discretion to withdraw the Claimant was fair. 
Borrowing language from the case-law on unfair dismissal, Mr Platt submitted 
that the Judge had failed to recognise that there was a "range of reasonable 
responses" available to the FCO in the circumstances in which it found itself 
after Mr Wood had spoken to Mr Courtenay, and that his decision that 
immediate withdrawal was unfair constituted the vice of "substitution" – that 
is, of holding that the FCO's decision was unfair only because it was not the 
decision that he himself would have made. He also argued that it was wrong of 
the Judge to focus only on the withdrawal of the Claimant from his post, and 
that it was necessary to assess the fairness of his treatment as a whole: in 
particular, it was relevant that he subsequently went through a disciplinary 
process which the Judge found to be fair (save in one purely procedural 
respect) and that he benefited from the services of the FCO's Welfare 
Department. 
60. I do not accept that the Judge misdirected himself in any way. He recognised 
explicitly that the FCO enjoyed a broad discretion whether to withdraw a post-
holder for operational reasons and that sometimes speed would be important 
and might preclude any effective investigation. But that is not in any way 
inconsistent with his finding that the way that that discretion was exercised in 
the particular circumstances of the Claimant's case was unfair: indeed that 
finding could be expressed as a finding that the Claimant's immediate 
withdrawal, without any chance to rebut the allegations made, was "outside 
the range of reasonable responses". In judging the question of fairness it was 
irrelevant that the Claimant may have been treated fairly in the subsequent 
disciplinary proceedings: his definitive withdrawal from his current post was a 
distinct and complete act. The truth is that the FCO's real case on this point is 
simply that the Judge's decision that it had acted unfairly was wrong. 
61. Since the hearing the FCO has drawn to our attention the decision of this 
Court, handed down on 7 October 2014, in Coventry University v Mian [2014] 
EWCA Civ 1275, which, like the present case, involved a claim that an 
employer had acted in breach of its duty of care to the employee in bringing 
disciplinary proceedings without any sufficient basis. It was common ground 
that the correct test in deciding whether the duty had been breached was 
"whether the decision to instigate disciplinary proceedings was outside the 
range of reasonable decisions open to an employer in the circumstances": see 
para. 31. But that does not help the FCO in this case since I believe that that is 
in substance the test which the Judge applied. 
62. Turning, therefore, to the real question – that is, whether the Judge's decision 
was wrong – Mr Platt submitted that the FCO was entitled to take the view 
that the Claimant's immediate withdrawal was necessary. He contended that 
the misconduct alleged by Mr Courtenay was very grave; that on the basis of 
what he had told Mr Wood serious damage had already been done to UK-
Belize relations; that Mr Courtenay, despite being in opposition, remained a 
key figure in the negotiations to end the long-running border dispute with 
Guatemala; and that the damage to the Claimant's role if the allegations 
surfaced would render his position untenable. And all this was exacerbated by 
the clear evidence that the High Commission was not a happy ship. 
63. I am prepared to accept all that, though I am bound to say that the gravity of 
the allegations and their alleged consequences seem to me, as they did to the 
Judge, rather overstated. But none of it meets the essential point that it was 
unnecessary for the FCO to act as precipitately as it did, without any further 
inquiries of any kind and without even putting the allegations to the Claimant. 
It is indeed rather surprising to see the FCO making a decision of this gravity 
on the basis of a single telephone conversation with a politician in the host 
country: even apart from the question of fairness to the post-holder, one might 
have expected some consideration of whether the informant might have his 
own agenda or be otherwise unreliable. 
64. Mr Platt's principal answer to this fundamental difficulty in his case depended 
on Mr Wood's promise to Mr Courtenay that he would not "play back" his 
allegations directly to the Claimant. That promise, he submitted, in practice 
precluded those allegations being put to the Claimant in any useful way. (He 
made essentially the same point about the allegations by the staff; but that is 
not of real significance, since, as already noted, the FCO accepted that it was 
not those which led to the Claimant's withdrawal.) 
65. I should start by observing that the concern that putting Mr Courtenay's 
allegations to the Claimant would involve a breach of confidence could only 
be a partial answer to the unfairness case: it does not address the failure to 
make any other enquiries. But I am not persuaded that it is a good point in any 
event. The Judge's observation at para. 118 of his judgment that "fairness 
trumps confidentiality" may be rather too broadly expressed, but he was 
entitled to take the view in this case that if the FCO was going to take so 
drastic a step it should have found a way of dealing with the confidentiality 
issue. One possibility would have been to disclose the content of Mr 
Courtenay's allegations without revealing their source. But the more direct 
course was to seek Mr Courtenay's consent to disclosure. As the Judge pointed 
out, Mr Courtenay was bound to appreciate that if any action were to be taken 
on his allegations his identity would have to emerge; and he made no demur 
when Mr Gifford asked him to go on the record only a couple of weeks later: 
see para. 29 above. 
66. Mr Platt also emphasised that this was a withdrawal for operational reasons, 
which did not depend on the Claimant being guilty of misconduct and need 
have no adverse effect on his career. The Judge's requirement that the FCO 
conduct a "preliminary investigation" before making such a decision was an 
inappropriate inhibition on an operational decision and involved importing a 
process appropriate only to misconduct proceedings. Such a submission might 
be appropriate in some circumstances, but it has no force on the facts of this 
case. I accept that the decision could be classified as operational, because the 
FCO, at least arguably, proceeded on the basis that the making of the 
allegations by Mr Courtenay made the Claimant's position untenable 
irrespective of whether the truth of those allegations had yet been established. 
But "misconduct" and "operational" cannot be so neatly differentiated. Even if 
the withdrawal was classified as operational the Claimant would not have been 
withdrawn unless the FCO had believed that the allegations against him 
were potentially reliable, which in practice meant that it was committed to a 
misconduct investigation. And the impact on the Claimant would be the same: 
he would be losing his post, in advance of any disciplinary process and 
whatever the outcome of that process, because serious allegations of 
misconduct had been made against him. The requirements of fairness cannot 
be evaded simply by the use of a different label. The Judge did not say that the 
whole panoply of a fact-finding investigation was required. He said only that 
the FCO should have made "some preliminary investigation" and exercised 
"some critical judgement". 
67. I would for those reasons dismiss the FCO's challenge to the Judge's finding 
that the Claimant's withdrawal, carried out in the way that it was, was unfair. 
Mr Gifford's Dual Role 
68. Cranston J's finding at para. 131 of his judgment that it was unfair for Mr 
Gifford to act as both fact-finder and disciplinary decision-taker has no 
practical consequences, for the reasons given at para. 52 (4) above. However, I 
should say that I respectfully disagree with that finding. In the circumstances I 
need give my reasons only briefly. 
69. I acknowledge that in the more elaborate forms of disciplinary procedure 
which provide for distinct investigatory and decision-making stages it is 
commonly stipulated that the decision-taker should be someone who has not 
been involved at the investigatory stage. That is now also what ACAS 
recommends. Its Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures 
published in April 2009 says, at para. 6: 
"In misconduct cases, where practicable, different people should carry 
out the investigation and disciplinary hearing." 
But I cannot agree that that represents "a basic principle of natural justice". I 
note that earlier editions of the ACAS Code contained no such 
recommendation. No doubt there is a risk that the process of investigating the 
primary facts may make it more difficult for the person responsible for the 
ultimate decision to step back from his work and take an objective view of the 
evidence produced; and splitting the two roles enhances "transparency". It also 
approximates to the conduct of criminal proceedings, with the separate roles 
of prosecutor and Judge. But there can also be disadvantages, particularly 
where (unlike in Court proceedings) the decision-taker does not himself or 
herself see the witnesses and is reliant on the investigator's assessment of 
them. In any event disciplinary proceedings in an employment law context are 
of a fundamentally different nature from criminal, or civil, proceedings in the 
Courts: see the observations of Elias LJ in Mattu v University Hospitals 
Coventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust [2012] EWCA Civ 641, [2013] ICR 
270, at para. 101 (p. 299) and Christou v Haringey London Borough 
Council [2013] EWCA Civ 178, [2014] QB 131, at para. 48 (pp. 142-3). I 
would regard the process now recommended by ACAS as representing good 
practice but not as a requirement of fairness in every case. 
70. In the present case a considered view was taken by the FCO's conduct adviser 
that Mr Gifford's knowledge of the detail and his experience of having 
interviewed the witnesses was an important advantage which justified him 
taking the role of decision-taker. I can see nothing wrong in that. 
(2) CAUSATION 
71. Mr Platt made four distinct points under this head. I take them in turn. 
72. First, he submitted that Mr Gifford carried out, within two or three weeks of 
the withdrawal decision, the very investigation which the Judge said should 
have occurred before that decision and found that there was a case to answer 
on both of the matters that led to his withdrawal; and that it followed that if 
the FCO had done what the Judge said that fairness required the decision 
would have been the same. 
73. I do not accept this. At paras. 122-123 of the judgment (see para. 46 (5) 
above) the Judge considered carefully what Ms Le Jeune and her colleagues 
would have decided if they had made the preliminary enquiries which he 
believed were necessary, and he gave reasons for concluding that if they had 
done so Mr Courtenay's allegations would have "taken on a quite different 
complexion" and the Claimant would not have been withdrawn. Those reasons 
have not been challenged as such, and in any event I can see nothing wrong 
with them. If they stand up, it seems to me no answer to say that Mr Gifford, 
considering a different question in different circumstances, concluded that 
there was a "case to answer". (I also note, though this is not of central 
importance, that as regards the allegations of the Claimant's behaviour towards 
women – which is what matters as regards the withdrawal decision – his 
conclusion was in fairly equivocal terms: see para. 32 above). 
74. Secondly, Mr Platt submitted that Mr Gifford's finding of bullying behaviour 
towards the Commission staff meant that the Claimant would have been 
withdrawn at that stage if he had not been withdrawn already. But that comes 
up against essentially the same difficulty as the previous submission. The 
Judge found in terms that if the FCO had acted fairly the allegations about the 
Claimant's conduct towards Commission staff would not have been made the 
subject of a disciplinary process (see para. 48 above); thus there would have 
been no misconduct finding against him. That reflects the reality of the matter: 
the FCO had only weeks previously dealt with essentially the same allegations 
by means of an informal warning, and nothing had changed since then. 
75. Thirdly, he challenged the Judge's finding that if the Claimant had not been 
withdrawn he would never have been affected by depression. He referred to 
the joint report which was before the Court from two psychiatrists, Dr Stuart 
Turner and Dr Martin Baggaley. They were asked what was the cause of the 
Claimant's depression. Their answer reads as follows: 
"In this case, Dr Turner believes the cause of the clinical depression 
was the outcome of the formal investigation, with its findings of 
misconduct and the final written warning. 
Dr Baggaley considers that several factors had a cumulative impact in 
causing the depression although he accepts that had the Claimant been 
exonerated in August 2008, and found another suitable posting, he 
would probably not have become depressed. Dr Baggaley considers 
that of particular importance was Mr Yapp's sense of injustice and a 
perceived failure by his employers to follow due process. Dr Baggaley 
considers that his treatment by the media contributed significantly to 
his stress as did his suspension." 
Mr Platt's submission is encapsulated at paras. 79-80 of the FCO's skeleton 
argument, as follows: 
"79. … [T]he learned Judge's conclusion that had the Respondent not 
been withdrawn from post "he would never have been affected" is 
inconsistent with the joint medical evidence to the effect that it was the 
later decision on the disciplinary investigation and not the 
withdrawal per se which caused his psychiatric injury … . The joint 
medical evidence made clear that had the Respondent been exonerated 
and found an alternative post he would not have developed depression, 
and that he did not develop depression (as opposed to stress) for at 
least 2 months after the decision to withdraw him (during which time 
many additional stressors accumulated). 
80. Accordingly, there was no injury resultant from the identified 
breach of contract and the learned Judge should have so found." 
76. I do not accept this. The Judge evidently accepted Dr Baggaley's opinion that 
several factors accumulated to cause the Claimant's illness and that one of 
those factors was his unfair treatment at the start of the story (which was 
plainly a, if not the, major component in his sense of injustice and his 
perception that he had been denied due process). He was entitled to accept that 
evidence. The fact that depression did not develop straightaway does not 
preclude such a conclusion. Nor does Dr Baggaley's opinion that if the 
Claimant had been promptly exonerated and had been found another post he 
would not have developed depression mean that the fact that that did not 
happen was the sole cause of his illness. 
77. Fourthly, he argued that the Judge was wrong to find that the Claimant's 
cardiac illness did not break the chain of causation. Ms Le Jeune's evidence 
had been that if the Claimant had still been in post in Belize when that illness 
occurred he would have had to be "short-toured". She had given reasons for 
that evidence which the Judge had described as "cogent and considered", and 
there was no basis on which he could have rejected it. It was no answer to say 
that it was "speculative": any evidence about the future necessarily is. 
78. I cannot accept this submission either. This was a claim for future loss of 
earnings. The conventional approach in such a case is to calculate, or assess, 
the earnings that would have been received over the period in question and 
then to discount for contingencies – that is, for the chance that the employee 
might not have received those earnings, in whole or in part, for some reason 
for which the defendant is not responsible.[2] Death or serious illness is the 
classic example of such a contingency. It is not necessary or appropriate for 
the Court to decide, applying the balance of probabilities, whether such a 
contingency will or will not occur: it is a matter of assessing the chances, 
which will of course generally have to be done on a very broad-brush basis. 
What the Judge was in practice being asked to do when it was submitted that 
the Claimant's illness "broke the chain of causation" was to find that there was 
no realistic chance – that is, none that was sufficiently substantial to sound in 
damages – that he could have completed his posting in Belize or obtained 
another overseas posting (which is what produces the higher level of 
earnings); in other words, he was being asked to find as a fact that he would 
have been short-toured and also that he would have been unfit for a further 
overseas posting. Once that is understood, it is clear that the Judge's approach 
was correct. His finding that whether the Claimant would have been short-
toured was "speculative" meant that he was not prepared to make a positive 
finding that it would have happened; and he went on to find that even if the 
Claimant would have been short-toured he had "a reasonable chance" of a 
further foreign posting once he had recovered. If the Judge had had in due 
course to assess damages he would have had to decide what discount was 
appropriate to reflect those findings; but that never occurred because the 
parties agreed quantum (see para. 4 above). 
(3) REMOTENESS 
The Submissions in Outline 
79. The issue here is whether the Judge was entitled to award the Claimant 
damages for his depressive illness, and thus also for the pecuniary losses that 
flowed from it. It is the FCO's case that even if that illness was caused by any 
of the breaches[3] which the Judge found it was too remote a consequence to 
sound in damages. Mr Platt addressed the position separately in contract and 
in tort. 
80. Contract. Mr Platt's primary case was advanced on the basis that the claims on 
which the Claimant had succeeded (ignoring the claim based on Mr Gifford 
conducting both stages of the procedure, where he had succeeded on breach 
but lost on causation) were purely contractual in character and that 
accordingly the relevant rules as to remoteness were those applying to 
breaches of contract. He submitted that as a matter of law damages for 
psychiatric illness were irrecoverable in contract where the claim could not 
succeed in tort. But he submitted in the alternative that the claim should in any 
event have been held to be too remote on the facts of the present case. There 
was nothing in the Claimant's history or the medical evidence to suggest that 
he was vulnerable to developing a psychiatric illness if treated unfairly in the 
way that (on the Judge's findings) he was; and in those circumstances there 
was no basis for a finding that it was "not unlikely" that he would do so. On 
the contrary, it was indeed unlikely: stress and upset were one thing, but 
clinical depression was another. 
81. Tort. As already discussed, Mr Platt submitted that the Judge had not made 
any finding that the FCO was in breach of its duty of care in tort, but for the 
reasons given at para. 56 above I would reject that submission. However, he 
also submitted that even if the test of remoteness in tort – i.e. whether the 
injury claimed for was reasonably foreseeable – fell to be applied the claim 
was still too remote. He relied on the guidance in the leading stress-at-work 
case of Hatton v Sutherland [2002] EWCA Civ 76, [2002] ICR 613, which I 
set out at para. 97 below. He made essentially the same points about pre-
existing vulnerability as he had made in relation to the claim in contract. But 
he also relied in particular on an observation in Hatton to the effect that an 
employer who offers his employees a confidential advice service, with referral 
to appropriate counselling or treatment services, is unlikely to be found in 
breach of duty as a result of exposing them to stress at work: he pointed out 
that the Claimant was offered, and took advantage of, precisely such a service 
(see para. 27 above). As I have already pointed out, if Mr Platt's submissions 
on this are right they not only go to quantum but undermine the claim itself in 
so far as it is based on the common law duty of care, since the duty to take 
reasonable steps to prevent psychiatric injury only arises if such injury is 
reasonably foreseeable. 
82. In response Ms McNeill pointed out that, contrary to Mr Platt's assertion, the 
Judge had found that the Claimant could recover in tort for his unfair 
withdrawal. But she submitted that in any event, whether applying the 
contractual or the tortious test of remoteness, the Judge had been amply 
entitled to find that it was not unlikely, or was reasonably foreseeable, that the 
Claimant would develop a depressive illness as a result of being withdrawn 
from his post unfairly. She submitted that this case was of a very different 
character from Hatton and the other stress-at-work cases. It was not a case of 
an employer failing to protect an employee from the effect of the normal 
pressures of his job. Rather, it was a case of a one-off act of serious and 
career-threatening unfairness: it was in no way surprising that it should have 
had such an impact on him as to cause a depressive illness. The Judge had 
been right to see a close analogy with the decision in Gogay, where an 
employee had recovered damages for a psychiatric illness caused by a "knee-
jerk" disciplinary suspension. Ms McNeill referred us to the judgment of Elias 
LJ in Crawford v Suffolk Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust [2012] EWCA 
Civ 138, [2012] IRLR 402, where he observed that suspension "can be 
psychologically very damaging": see para. 73 (p. 409). What happened to the 
Claimant in the present case was indeed liable to be more damaging than an 
ordinary disciplinary suspension, because his withdrawal from post was 
permanent: the situation was closer to that of an unfair dismissal. 
83. Those submissions involved extensive reference to authority, and before 
considering them I shall have to review in some detail the cases to which we 
were taken. 
The Case-Law 
84. There was no dispute before us as to the general principles governing 
remoteness in contract and in tort and we were not taken to The Heron 
II [1969] 1 AC 350 or The Wagon Mound (no. 2) [1967] AC 617, though both 
were piously included in the bundle of authorities. It was accepted that the 
essential question in contract is whether the damage in question was of a kind 
which was "not unlikely" to result[4] and that in tort it is whether the damage 
was reasonably foreseeable; and that the former test requires a higher degree 
of likelihood of damage occurring than the latter. 
85. We were, however, referred by Ms McNeill to the decision of this Court 
in Attia v British Gas plc [1988] QB 304, as a statement of the correct 
approach to the question of the foreseeability of psychiatric illness in claims 
brought in tort. In that case the plaintiff suffered a psychiatric illness as a 
result of seeing her house seriously damaged by a fire caused by the 
defendant's negligence. One of the issues was whether such a reaction was 
reasonably foreseeable. As to that, Dillon LJ said, at p. 312 F-H: 
"Whether it was reasonably foreseeable to the reasonable man – 
whether a reasonable onlooker, or, in the context of the present case, a 
reasonable gas fitter employed by the defendants to work in the 
plaintiff's house – is to be decided, not on the evidence of psychiatrists 
as to the degree of probability that the particular cause would produce 
the particular effect in a person of normal disposition or customary 
phlegm, but by the judge, relying on his own opinion of the operation 
of cause and effect in psychiatric medicine, treating himself as the 
reasonable man, and forming his own view from the primary facts as to 
whether the chain of cause and effect was reasonably foreseeable: see 
per Lord Bridge in McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410, 432C–D. 
The good sense of the judge is, it would seem, to be enlightened by 
progressive awareness of mental illness: per Lord Bridge at p. 443D." 
Bingham LJ said, at p. 319 E: 
"So the question in any case such as this, applying the ordinary test of 
remoteness in tort, is whether the defendant should reasonably have 
contemplated psychiatric damage to the plaintiff as a real, even if 
unlikely, result of careless conduct on his part." 
One of the issues in the appeal was whether damages could be recovered for 
"nervous shock" caused by witnessing damage to property rather than some 
physical injury (as in cases like Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 42). In discussing 
that argument Bingham LJ gave two examples to which Ms McNeill attached 
some importance. He said, at p. 320 E-F: 
"Suppose, for example, that a scholar's life's work of research or 
composition were destroyed before his eyes as a result of a defendant's 
careless conduct, causing the scholar to suffer reasonably foreseeable 
psychiatric damage. Or suppose that a householder returned home to 
find that his most cherished possessions had been destroyed through 
the carelessness of an intruder in starting a fire or leaving a tap 
running, causing reasonably foreseeable psychiatric damage to the 
owner. I do not think a legal principle which forbade recovery in these 
circumstances could be supported." 
86. Ms McNeill also referred to McLoughlin v Jones [2002] QB 1312, where 
Brooke LJ contemplated that it might be held to be foreseeable – though he 
did not himself decide – that a defendant who was imprisoned following a 
wrongful conviction as a result of his solicitor's negligence might recover for a 
psychiatric illness engendered by his "burning sense of injustice": see para. 43 
(p. 1328 B-C). 
87. The remaining authorities to which we were referred all concerned claims for 
damages for psychiatric illness brought by employees against their employers. 
I take them in chronological order. 
Walker 
88. In Walker v Northumberland County Council [1995] ICR 702 the plaintiff was 
a council employee who had suffered a nervous breakdown[5] as a result of an 
excessive workload. He returned to work after a time but no adjustments were 
made to his workload and he suffered a further breakdown. Colman J held that 
as a matter of principle an employer owed his employees a duty of care to 
prevent not only physical but also psychiatric injury where the risk of such 
injury was reasonably foreseeable. He held that no such risk was foreseeable 
prior to the plaintiff's first breakdown; but the position changed once that 
breakdown had occurred, and he found the council liable for the consequences 
of the second breakdown because it had not taken reasonable steps to reduce 
the risk. I should note that, although the claim appears to have been 
formulated in tort, Colman J pointed out (at p. 721A) that "the scope of the 
duty of care owed to an employee to take reasonable steps to provide a safe 
system of work is co-extensive with the scope of the implied term as to the 
employee's safety in the contract of employment". 
Gogay 
89. In Gogay v Hertfordshire County Council [2000] IRLR 703 the claimant was 
a care worker in a council children's home who was suspended and made the 
subject of a disciplinary investigation following an allegation that she had 
sexually abused one of the children in the home. There were no reasonable 
grounds for allegation or the suspension. She developed a depressive illness in 
consequence. In the County Court the council was held liable for breach of 
contract, on the basis that the claimant's unjustified suspension was a breach 
of the Malik term: no breach of the common law duty of care was alleged. At a 
subsequent remedy hearing she was awarded damages for personal injury, i.e. 
her psychiatric illness, and for the loss of earnings which she had suffered in 
consequence. 
90. The council appealed against both the liability and the damages decisions. The 
appeal was dismissed in both respects. I need say nothing about the liability 
appeal, save to note that Hale LJ (who delivered the only substantive 
judgment) described the decision to suspend the claimant as a "knee-jerk 
reaction", which is evidently the origin of the Judge's use of that phrase in 
para. 137 of his judgment. As regards damages, the council argued that the 
Judge's decision was contrary to the principle, originating in Addis v 
Gramophone Co. Ltd. [1909] AC 488 and more recently enunciated in Bliss v 
South East Thames Regional Health Authority [1985] IRLR 308, that an 
employee cannot recover damages for distress or injured feelings arising from 
a breach of contract on the part of the employer. Hale LJ held that cases of that 
kind must be distinguished from cases involving a recognised psychiatric 
illness and that psychiatric injury was not in principle different from physical 
injury: see paras. 62-65 (pp. 710-711). At para. 63 she notes that such 
damages were awarded in Walker and refers to Colman J's observation that the 
scope of the duties in tort and in contract is the same. She continues: 
"The duty in this case is owed purely in contract, rather than in tort, but 
there can be no more reason to distinguish between physical and 
psychiatric injury in this case than there is in the case of other breaches 
of an employer's duties." 
91. Gogay is thus clear authority for the proposition that there is no bar in 
principle to an employee recovering damages for psychiatric injury caused by 
a breach of the Malik term. It is accordingly a complete answer to Mr Platt's 
submission (see para. 80 above) that such damages are irrecoverable in 
principle. 
92. Beyond that, however, Ms McNeill relied on Gogay as an example of a case 
where the claimant recovered damages for psychiatric injury as a result of a 
one-off act of unfairness without, so far as appears, any need to prove a known 
vulnerability of the type that was decisive in Walkerand which was treated, 
later, in Hatton as (usually) a pre-requisite of liability. But it is important to 
appreciate that Gogay gives no real guidance about the approach to 
remoteness in cases of this kind. The issue did apparently arise, but all that 
Hale LJ says about it, at para. 70 of the judgment, is: 
"Finally, [counsel for the employer] sought to argue that such losses 
were not foreseeable at the time the contract was made. To that extent, 
of course, there is a difference between breach of duty in tort and 
breach of duty in contract. However, the judge made a clear finding 
that they were foreseeable at the relevant time, and that is a finding of 
fact with which this court will not interfere." 
We do not have the first-instance judgment on damages, so we do not know on 
what basis the Judge resolved the issue of "foreseeability" in the claimant's 
favour.[6] It is, however, worth noting that it appears from the recitation of the 
history in the judgment (see para. 10) there had been an episode a few months 
previously when the claimant had been so stressed by the behaviour of the 
child whom she was subsequently suspected of abusing that she had had to 
take a week off work; and her manager had sent her a letter of support. There 
may therefore have been a reason why the employer should have been aware 
that she was peculiarly vulnerable. 
Johnson v Unisys 
93. In Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13, [2003] 1 AC 518, the claimant 
brought a claim in the County Court for psychiatric injury caused by his unfair 
dismissal, which he characterised as involving both a breach of the Malik term 
and breach of a duty of care owed in tort. The essential unfairness of which he 
complained was his dismissal without a proper opportunity to rebut the case 
against him. There is obviously some parallel with the present case. 
94. The House of Lords upheld the decision of the judge that the claim should be 
struck out. The majority did so on the basis that such a claim was inconsistent 
with the unfair dismissal regime under the Employment Rights Act 1996. But 
the basis of Lord Steyn's reasoning was that the claim was too remote. At para. 
29 of his opinion (p. 537 E-H) he recited the claimant's pleaded case that he 
had a previous history of work-related stress, of which the employers were 
aware; but he held that the allegations of knowledge were inadequate and the 
episode relied on was too long ago for psychiatric injury to be considered 
sufficiently likely. 
95. Lord Steyn's reasoning is very abbreviated, though it can be supplemented to a 
limited extent by reference to the decision of the Court of Appeal, which also 
(albeit obiter) held the claim to be too remote: Lord Steyn expressly approved 
the reasoning of Lord Woolf MR at [1999] ICR 809, at p. 817 C-E. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that his ratio necessarily assumes that the claimant's 
allegation that he lost his job as a result of unfair treatment was not by itself 
enough to support a finding that he was sufficiently likely to suffer psychiatric 
injury, and that evidence of some known pre-existing vulnerability was 
required. It seems probable that Lord Steyn had in mind the decision 
in Walker, to which he had referred earlier in his opinion (see para. 19, at p. 
532 C-D). The other members of the House did not address this aspect. 
96. It is right to say that Ms McNeill drew our attention to the fact that Lord Steyn 
referred to Gogay, and with evident approval: again, see para. 19 of his 
opinion. But that does not advance the argument. It is clear that he referred 
to Gogay simply as an example of a successful claim for psychiatric injury in 
the employment field, coupling it with Walker: the context required no 
consideration of the remoteness issue. 
Hatton/Barber 
97. In Hatton v Sutherland [2002] EWCA Civ 76, [2002] ICR 613, this Court 
heard four appeals concerning claims for damages for psychiatric illness 
caused by over-work or other kinds of inability to cope with pressure at work 
– i.e. cases of a similar character to Walker. The judgment of the Court was 
delivered by Hale LJ. It begins at paras. 3-17 (pp. 617-622) with a discussion 
of some of the features of stress at work claims. At paras. 18-42 (pp. 622-631) 
there is a review of the applicable law: among other things the Court 
confirmed, upholding Walker, "that the ordinary principles of employers' 
liability [apply] to a claim for psychiatric illness arising from employment" 
(see paras. 19-22 (pp. 623-4)). (Strictly, this did not fall for decision, since the 
employers did not argue to the contrary. But the Court believed that it was 
already the subject of binding authority, referring to Petch v Customs and 
Excise Commissioners [1993] ICR 789 and Garrett v Camden London 
Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 395.) This is followed at para. 43 (pp. 
631-2) by a summary stating sixteen "practical propositions". I need only set 
out the following: 
" (1) There are no special control mechanisms applying to claims for 
psychiatric (or physical) illness or injury arising from the stress of 
doing the work the employee is required to do (para 22). The ordinary 
principles of employer's liability apply (para 20). 
(2) The threshold question is whether this kind of harm to this 
particular employee was reasonably foreseeable (para 23): this has two 
components (a) an injury to health (as distinct from occupational 
stress) which (b) is attributable to stress at work (as distinct from other 
factors) (para 25). 
(3) Foreseeability depends upon what the employer knows (or ought 
reasonably to know) about the individual employee. Because of the 
nature of mental disorder, it is harder to foresee than physical injury, 
but may be easier to foresee in a known individual than in the 
population at large (para 23). An employer is usually entitled to 
assume that the employee can withstand the normal pressures of the 
job unless he knows of some particular problem or vulnerability (para 
29). 
(4)-(10) ... 
(11) An employer who offers a confidential advice service, with 
referral to appropriate counselling or treatment services, is unlikely to 
be found in breach of duty (paras 17 and 33). 
(12)-(16) ..." 
It is proposition (3) on which Mr Platt primarily relies, and specifically on the 
point that psychiatric injury will not (usually) be foreseeable by an employer 
unless he is aware of some previous problem or vulnerability. But he also 
relies on proposition (11). 
98. The Court then proceeded to consider the individual claims. In three cases the 
employer's appeal was allowed. One of those three cases was the subject of a 
further appeal to the House of Lords – see Barber v Somerset County 
Council [2004] UKHL 13, [2004] 1 WLR 1089. The appeal was allowed. Lord 
Walker, who gave the principal opinion for the majority, referred to the Court 
of Appeal's "propositions" at para. 63 (p. 1109 A-C) as giving "useful practical 
guidance"; but he added that: 
"... [they] must be read as that, and not as having anything like 
statutory force. Every case will depend on its own facts." 
99. I should make three particular points about Hatton: 
(1) As a matter of formal analysis, the issues which were before the Court 
were only concerned with liability. The Court was concerned with the 
foreseeability of psychiatric injury in the context of whether a duty arose to 
take steps to protect an employee from such injury; and remoteness of damage 
was not discussed at all. But, at the risk of spelling out the obvious, the test of 
foreseeability in that context must be the same when it comes to damages: if 
the risk of psychiatric injury is sufficiently foreseeable to require reasonable 
steps to be taken to mitigate it it must also be sufficiently foreseeable to 
require compensation if it arises. Bingham LJ made this point in Attia (see at 
p. 319 D-E). 
(2) Ms McNeill is clearly right to say that the factual context in which the 
Court was considering foreseeability was that of employees who became ill as 
a result of what is referred to in proposition (3) as "the normal pressures of the 
job". It was not concerned as such with the foreseeability of an employee 
suffering a psychiatric illness as a result of a particular traumatic event in the 
workplace. However, as discussed below, the case-law has moved on in that 
respect. 
(3) The Court in Hatton throughout uses the language of tort. But it was 
certainly aware that the duty of care in question arose in contract as well. At 
para. 21 it identified various different categories of cases giving rise to claims 
of psychiatric injury: the third category is described as "contractual claims by 
primary victims" and it is said to include the claims which it was considering, 
together with the other reported cases of claims by employees –
 Petch, Walker and Garrett (see at p. 624 B-C). 
Croft 
100. In Croft v Broadstairs & St Peter's Town Council [2003] EWCA Civ 
676 the claimant, who was employed by the council as its town clerk, was 
given a formal warning for alleged misconduct. The warning was both 
unjustified, because there was no sufficient reason to believe that she had 
committed the misconduct in question, and unfair because she had been given 
no opportunity to respond to the allegations: the first she heard of them was 
when she received the letter containing the warning. As a result she suffered a 
severe depressive illness. The claimant brought proceedings in the County 
Court alleging both a breach of the Malik duty and a breach of the common 
law duty of care. The Judge's self-direction as to the applicable law was based 
on Hatton (see paras. 8 and 9 of the judgment in this Court), but when he 
came to make his finding of liability he did so on the basis of a breach of 
the Malik duty, without any express reference to the duty of care (see para. 
25). He found that the claimant's illness was a foreseeable consequence of the 
breach which he had found, and he awarded damages accordingly. The council 
appealed. 
101. The leading judgment in this Court was given by Potter LJ. He noted 
the apparent mismatch between the Judge's self-direction as to the basis of the 
claim and the actual finding made; but he observed that "nothing here turned 
on that point in this appeal, the matter being approached by the Judge overall 
as set out at paragraphs 8 and 9 above [that is, on the basis of Hatton]" – see 
para. 26 of his judgment. The remainder of the judgment treats the claim as 
one to which the guidance in Hatton applies, albeit one where the breach 
consisted not of an excessive workload but of the giving of the unfair warning 
(see para. 9). Potter LJ held that there had been no evidence on which the 
Judge could have found that the Council was aware of any "psychiatric 
vulnerability" on the claimant's part. He continued, at para. 73: 
"That left the council in the position of employers who were entitled to 
expect ordinary robustness in the claimant in an employment context, 
including disciplinary matters, in which she had certainly never been 
involved before." 
He referred to evidence from a psychiatrist that "in a person of ordinary 
robustness … a nervous breakdown would not, medically at least, be a 
foreseeable result of a reprimand as to her conduct". He noted that one of the 
councillors was aware that the claimant had had counselling, but he said that 
that 
"… was plainly insufficient to import knowledge on the council's part 
sufficient to demonstrate the likelihood of feelings of rejection and 
distress so strong as to trigger a nervous breakdown on receipt of the 
letter. Such a breakdown was not the reasonably foreseeable product of 
the conduct concerned, and therefore the council are entitled to 
succeed in the appeal." 
102. Tuckey LJ agreed. He said, at para. 76: 
"I have great sympathy for the claimant. The council's letter … and 
some of their subsequent conduct were unfair and hurtful, but that did 
not give the claimant a good claim of the kind made on her behalf 
unless she could show that the council were aware that she was a 
psychiatrically vulnerable person and that it was foreseeable that their 
letter and subsequent conduct might cause her to have a nervous 
breakdown. I think the judge's sympathy for the claimant and his 
outrage at what had happened led him to make findings on these two 
issues in favour of the claimant which were not open to him on the 
evidence for the reasons given by Potter LJ. This case illustrates the 
need for judges to guard against allowing sympathy and outrage to lead 
them astray." 
103. The appeal was accordingly allowed. Since the claim was treated as 
being for breach of the common law duty of care, the result of the finding as to 
recoverable loss meant that the claimant had failed to establish liability, and 
the claim was dismissed. 
104. The significance of Croft is that it explicitly applies what I may call 
the Hatton approach in a case which was not concerned with "the normal 
pressures of the job" but with the imposition of an unfair disciplinary sanction: 
that is, the Court was not prepared to find that psychiatric injury was a 
foreseeable consequence of the claimant's unfair treatment in the absence of 
evidence of some pre-existing vulnerability. It is true that the judgments do 
not articulate any justification for extending the reach of Hatton in this way, 
but there is no doubt that it is central to the reasoning of the Court. In any 
event it does not seem to me unreasonable. In the first place, I can see serious 
difficulties in applying in the real world a distinction between cases of 
continuous pressures on the one hand and one-off events on the other: an 
illness might, for example, be precipitated by a single "last straw" event 
against a background of longer-term pressure. Further, while there is 
obviously a factual difference between a continuing stressful situation and a 
one-off traumatic event, I am not convinced that they should be approached 
with different assumptions as to the potential for psychiatric injury. It is a 
normal characteristic of the employment relationship that employees may be 
criticised by the employer and sometimes face disciplinary action or other 
such procedures. And in an imperfect world it is not uncommon for such 
criticism or disciplinary process to be flawed to some extent: there will be a 
spectrum from minor procedural flaws to gross unfairness. The message 
of Croft is that it is not usually foreseeable that even disciplinary action which 
is quite seriously unfair will lead the employee to develop a psychiatric illness 
unless there are signs of pre-existing vulnerability. This is of course consistent 
with the approach of this Court and of Lord Steyn in Johnson. 
105. The way in which the Court in Croft effectively side-lined the claim 
for breach of the Malik term means that the decision gives no guidance on the 
approach to be taken to a purely contractual claim. I do not think it can be 
taken as deciding that there is no difference at all between a claim for breach 
of the common law duty of care and a claim for breach of the Malik term. If 
the council in Croft had been found to have acted in breach of contract the 
claimant should have succeeded on liability and would have been entitled at 
least to nominal damages, with issues as to the recoverability of damages for 
psychiatric injury arising in the context of quantum (as they did in Gogay); 
and to the extent that they did arise they would be governed by the contractual, 
rather than the tortious, test of remoteness (as occurred in Deadman – see 
paras. 111-113 below). But the Court seems to have thought that those formal 
differences were not of practical significance in the case before it; and no 
doubt that was right. 
Bonser 
106. In Bonser v RJB Mining (UK) Ltd. [2003] EWCA Civ 1296, [2003] 
IRLR 164, this Court allowed the employer's appeal in a case based on a claim 
that the employee had been subjected to an excessive workload. The case 
establishes no new principle, but it emphasises that it is not enough in a case 
of the Hatton type that it should be foreseeable that the claimant should be 
upset, or suffer stress, as a result of being unfairly overworked. What has to be 
foreseeable is that he or she will suffer a psychiatric illness: see per Ward LJ 
at paras. 26-27 and Simon Brown LJ at para. 31 (p. 167). 
Hartman 
107. In Hartman v South Essex Mental Health and Community Care NHS 
Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 6, [2005] ICR 782, this Court heard six appeals in 
cases where an employee had suffered a psychiatric injury at work: one of the 
appeals was Melville v Home Office. The appeals had been brought 
following Hatton but stayed pending the decision of the House of Lords 
in Barber. They too raise no new point of principle. Scott Baker LJ, giving the 
judgment of the Court, reviewed the case-law since Hatton (including Croft), 
and concluded, at para. 16 (p. 794 A-B): 
"In our judgment, none of these cases detracts from the utility of the 
guidance Hale LJ gave in Hatton and summarised in the sixteen 
propositions we have cited. On the other hand, what was said 
in Hatton was not intended to cover all the infinitely variable facts that 
are likely to arise in stress at work cases. The general principles are to 
be found in Hatton but we emphasise they need care in their 
application to the particular facts under consideration. For instance, 
while each appeal in Hatton involved an employee who had suffered 
ongoing stress in day-to-day work, the case of Melville, and to some 
extent Hartman, (see below) involved stress caused by specific 
traumas." 
108. Ms McNeill picked up on that final observation and relied in particular 
on the Court's decision in the Melville appeal. In that case the claimant was a 
healthcare officer in a prison. Among his duties was the recovery of the bodies 
of prisoners who had committed suicide. The County Court Judge found that 
he had suffered a stress-related psychiatric illness following a particularly 
distressing episode of this kind. Both he and, on appeal to the High Court, 
Jack J held that it was reasonably foreseeable that he might suffer such an 
illness as a result of his work. They relied in particular on a number of Home 
Office documents expressly recognising that risk and requiring procedures to 
be put in place to mitigate it. Those procedures were not followed and the 
Home Office was held liable. 
109. On the further appeal to this Court the Home Office argued that the 
decisions below had failed to follow Hatton because it was common ground 
that the claimant had shown no signs of any relevant vulnerability. That 
submission was rejected. Scott Baker LJ said, at paras. 133-4 (p. 817 D-F): 
"133. … As is apparent from the way in which the judgment 
in Hatton is expressed and as Lord Walker pointed out 
in Barber the guidance must be read as such and not as 
anything like a statute. Each case will depend on its own facts. 
Those parts of the Hattonjudgment relied on by [counsel for the 
Home Office] were primarily intended to help judges resolve 
the issue as to whether an employer ought to have foreseen the 
risk of psychiatric injury attributable to stress at work. The 
guidance recognises that such injury is more difficult to foresee 
than physical injury. The question of whether the particular 
employee has shown indications of impending harm to health is 
a very relevant question when considering a situation where the 
employer has not in fact foreseen the risk of psychiatric injury 
and the employee's workload would not ordinarily carry a 
foreseeable risk of such injury. 
134. But that is not this case. Here, on the only evidence before 
the court, the employer plainly did foresee that employees who 
were exposed to particular traumatic incidents might suffer 
psychiatric injury. There was only one answer to the simple 
question which the judges asked themselves. [Counsel's] 
submissions amounted to saying that what was in fact foreseen 
was not foreseeable." 
110. I can understand why Ms McNeill places some weight 
on Melville because the Home Office was indeed found liable without any 
evidence of the claimant having demonstrated a pre-existing vulnerability. But 
the assistance which she gets from it is limited because the reasoning of the 
Court turned on the fact that the employer had in fact foreseen the very risk 
which had eventuated. 
Deadman 
111. In Bristol City Council v Deadman [2007] EWCA Civ 822, [2007] 
IRLR 888, a colleague at work complained that the claimant had sexually 
harassed her, and that complaint was the subject of a formal investigation by 
the employer. The complaint was upheld by a panel convened under its 
harassment procedures, but that decision was quashed in response to a 
grievance brought by the claimant. The employer then decided to commence 
the investigation afresh: this was communicated to the claimant by leaving a 
letter on his desk at work. He developed a depressive illness. In the County 
Court his claim that the employer had acted in breach of the common law duty 
of care was dismissed, but the Judge upheld a claim for breach of contract on 
two bases – (a) that it was insensitive of the council to notify the claimant of 
its decision to resume the investigation merely by leaving a letter on his desk; 
and (b) under the applicable procedures the original harassment panel should 
have consisted of three members but had in fact comprised only two. It was 
held that his injury was caused by those breaches and he was awarded 
damages accordingly. 
112. This Court allowed the employer's appeal. I should draw attention to 
three elements in the reasoning of Moore-Bick LJ, who gave the leading 
judgment: 
(1) At para. 12 (p. 890) he considered the relationship between 
the Malik term and the common law duty of care. He concluded that 
the two: 
"… [cover] broadly the same ground as the employer's 
duty of care under the general common law, so that in 
practice it is usually a matter of indifference whether 
the employee who has suffered injury at work sues in 
contract or tort: see the comments of Clarke LJ 
in Martin v Lancashire County Council [2001] ICR 
197.[7]" 
(2) At paras. 20-23 (pp. 891-2) he considered the claim that the council 
was in breach of its common law duty of care. He referred 
to Hatton and continued, at para. 22: 
"Since, as the court observed, the threshold question is 
whether this kind of harm to this particular employee 
was reasonably foreseeable, it is necessary to bear in 
mind that to all appearances Mr. Deadman was a person 
of robust good health. He had worked for the Council 
for over thirty years and had an excellent attendance 
record, having been absent from work for only five days 
during that period due to ill health. There is nothing in 
the judge's findings to suggest that the Council should 
have been aware that he was liable to be severely 
adversely affected by the ordinary operation of its 
procedure for investigating complaints of harassment." 
(3) At paras. 43-47 (p. 894) he considered the issue of remoteness in 
the context of the purely contractual claim that the council had been in 
breach of its procedures by having two members on the panel instead 
of three. Applying the contractual test deriving from The Heron II, he 
held – unsurprisingly – that even if causation were established it was 
outside the reasonable contemplation of the parties that it was likely 
that a minor procedural breach of that kind would result in the claimant 
suffering a psychiatric illness. 
113. Ms McNeill submitted that Deadman was of no real help in the present 
case because the breaches relied on were so trivial. That is certainly true about 
the claim based on the composition of the panel, and perhaps also about the 
way in which the claimant was notified of the resumption of the investigation. 
But we are not ultimately concerned with the facts but with the principles 
applied by the Court. What is significant about Deadman is that, in the context 
of a claim based on the allegedly unreasonable conduct of a disciplinary 
procedure, Moore-Bick LJ regarded it as decisive that there was nothing in the 
claimant's history to suggest that he would be unable to cope with the impact 
of such conduct: in other words, he took a Hatton approach. It is true that the 
processes in question were part of a procedure for investigating a complaint by 
another employee rather than of a disciplinary procedure, but that cannot make 
a real difference – in both types of case the impact on the employee is that he 
is suspected of misconduct. 
Dickins 
114. Dickins v O2 plc [2008] EWCA Civ 1144, [2009] IRLR 58, is another 
case of the Hatton type. It was cited to us only because of an observation 
(picking up an earlier statement to the same effect in Daw v Intel Corp [2007] 
EWCA Civ 70, [2007] IRLR 355) that "proposition (11)" inHatton does not 
mean that an employer can discharge his duty of care in every case by 
providing a counselling service. 
The Post-Johnson Cases 
115. We were taken to the two further cases in the House of Lords and the 
Supreme Court which consider the implications of Johnson v Unisys, 
namely Eastwood v Magnox Electric plc [2004] UKHL 35, [2005] 1 AC 503, 
and Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust[2011] 
UKSC 58, [2012] 2 AC 22. In Eastwood both Lord Nicholls and Lord Steyn 
referred to Gogay in the course of discussing the unfortunate consequences 
of Johnson, and Lady Hale did the same in Edwards. But they did so simply as 
an example of a successful claim by an employee for damages for a 
psychiatric injury suffered as a result of an unfair suspension; those references 
add nothing on the issue of remoteness. 
116. Otherwise, these cases are of interest only as further illustrations of the 
kinds of circumstance in which claims for psychiatric injury may arise. In that 
context it is worth noting that in Eastwood the case as pleaded was that the 
two employees had been the victims of a sustained malicious campaign by 
their employer, involving the manipulation of the disciplinary procedure, 
deliberately in order to procure their dismissal. 
Rothwell/Grieves 
117. I should refer to one other case to which we were not taken in oral 
argument but to which Ms McNeill referred in her skeleton argument. Grieves 
v F T Everard & Sons Ltd is one of a quartet of cases in the House of Lords, 
reported as Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 
39, [2008] 1 AC 281, which concerned claimants who had developed pleural 
plaques as a result of negligent exposure to asbestos. It was held that the 
development of such plaques did not in itself constitute an injury; but Mr 
Grieves had suffered depression as a result of learning of his condition, which 
it was accepted did constitute an injury, and the question arose whether that 
was a foreseeable consequence of the defendants' negligence. Lord Hoffmann 
in his speech (with which the other members of the House agreed, though all 
also delivered speeches of their own) said that the relevant principles were to 
be found in Hatton, observing that although that case was concerned with 
psychiatric injury as a result of occupational stress "the general principles are 
in my opinion applicable to psychiatric injury caused by any breach of duty on 
the part of the employer" (see para. 24, at p. 294B). He held that it appeared 
from those principles that in the absence of some particular known problem or 
vulnerability an employer "is entitled to assume that his employees are 
persons of ordinary fortitude" (para. 25, at p. 294 D-E). He referred to the 
passage from the judgment of Lord Bridge in McLoughlin v O'Brian cited by 
Dillon LJ in Attia (above) and observed: 
"[T]his test restricts rather than enlarges the foreseeability of 
psychiatric illness. It allows for the fact that expert knowledge of cause 
and effect may not be available to the educated layman. It does not 
mean that the judge should give effect to speculation or urban legends 
unsupported by evidence." 
He went on to distinguish Page v Smith [1996] AC 155 and concluded by 
stating the applicable test as follows: 
"The general rule … requires one to decide whether it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the event which actually happened … would cause 
psychiatric illness to a person of reasonable fortitude. I think that the 
Court of Appeal was right to say that there was no basis for such a 
finding." 
Applying that test, he held that Mr Grieves's illness was not a reasonably 
foreseeable result of the defendants' breach of duty. 
118. Grieves does not state any new principle, but it is of value in this case 
as confirming that the principles stated in Hatton are not limited to the 
particular situations with which the Court was concerned but apply generally 
to cases in which psychiatric injury is said to have been caused to an employee 
by his employer's breach of duty. 
Summary 
119. With regard to the issues of foreseeability and remoteness the 
following propositions can be established from that review of the cases: 
(1) In considering, in the context of the common law duty of care, 
whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the acts or omissions of the 
employer may cause an employee to suffer a psychiatric injury, such 
an injury will not usually be foreseeable unless there were indications, 
of which the employer was or should have been aware, of some 
problem or psychological vulnerability on the part of the employee –
 Hatton. 
(2) That approach is not limited to cases of the Hatton type but extends 
to cases where the employer has committed a one-off act of unfairness 
such as the imposition of a disciplinary sanction –
 Croft and Deadman (also Grieves). 
(3) However, in neither kind of case should that be regarded as an 
absolute rule: Hatton contains no more than guidance, and each case 
must turn on its own facts – Hatton itself, but reinforced 
by Barber and Hartman. 
(4) In claims for breach of the common law duty of care it is 
immaterial that the duty arises in contract as well as tort: they are in 
substance treated as covered by tortious rules[8] – Walker, Hatton. In 
order to establish whether the duty is broken it will be necessary to 
establish, as above, whether psychiatric injury was reasonably 
foreseeable; and if that is established no issue as to remoteness can 
arise when such injury eventuates. 
(5) In claims for breach of the Malik duty, or of any other express 
contractual term, the contractual test of remoteness will be applicable –
 Deadman. 
120. As appears from Croft, and indeed from the present case, it will often 
be possible for the same conduct on the part of an employer to constitute both 
a breach of the common law duty of care and a breach of another contractual 
duty – most obviously the Malik term but perhaps also an express term. This 
overlap can lead to a regrettable complexity in the formal analysis. It may be 
that further thought needs to be given to whether the Malik term really has any 
separate role to play in this area: the Court in Croft seemed to think not. But it 
may be that the problem does not matter much in practice. Where a breach of 
the common law duty of care can be established it is not clear what the 
employee gains by formulating a distinct contractual claim. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
121. Although the Judge considered the breach of contract claim first, we 
are here concerned only with remoteness, and it makes more sense to start 
with the claim for breach of the common law duty of care since the tortious 
test of remoteness is more favourable to claimants. 
122. The Judge dealt with the breach of duty claim only briefly in the 
judgment – understandably so, because he had already upheld the breach of 
contract claim. He said only, at para. 143, that an employer concerned with the 
Claimant's welfare would not have withdrawn him from his post without 
(previously) informing him of the case against him; and that "causation and 
remoteness track my earlier findings". The latter reference must be to para. 
137, where he addresses remoteness in the context of the breach of contract 
claim: I have set this out at para. 53 (3) above. As will be seen, the dispositive 
reasoning is very short. The Judge acknowledged that the Claimant was 
"ostensibly robust" but concluded simply that "to my mind it could reasonably 
be contemplated … that depression would be a not unlikely result of a knee-
jerk withdrawal from post". That uses the language of the contractual test, 
which he was there considering; but his conclusion would of course apply a 
fortiori to the claim in tort. He did not rely on any medical evidence: in view 
of the passage from the judgment of Dillon LJ in Attia quoted at para. 85 
above he did not need to do so. Nor did he rely on any peculiar features either 
of the way that the Claimant was treated or of his personality. His reasoning 
was evidently based on a straightforward judgment, based on his own 
experience and assessment of human nature, that the gravity, and the 
unfairness, of what happened to the Claimant was such that it could be 
regarded as sufficiently likely that he would suffer an illness as a result. 
123. It follows from my summary of the authorities that, while it was 
certainly important that there was no reason for the FCO to believe that the 
Claimant had some special vulnerability (points (1) and (2)), the Judge was 
entitled not to treat that fact as decisive (point (3)). Each case depends on its 
own facts, and in principle the employer's conduct in a particular case might 
be so devastating that it was foreseeable that even a person of ordinary 
robustness might develop a depressive illness as a result: that was the point of 
Ms McNeill's reference to Bingham LJ's examples inAttia (see para. 85 
above). The question is whether this is such a case. I have already summarised 
Ms McNeill's reasons for contending that it is. 
124. I have not found this issue easy, but in the end I have come to the 
conclusion that the Judge was wrong to find that it was reasonably foreseeable 
that the FCO's conduct in withdrawing the Claimant from his post without 
having had the opportunity to state his case might lead him to develop 
psychiatric illness. My reasons are as follows. 
125. I start from the position that it will in my view be exceptional that an 
apparently robust employee, with no history of any psychiatric ill-health, will 
develop a depressive illness as a result even of a very serious setback at work. 
That is, inevitably, based to some extent on my own assessment of human 
nature, but it also reflects the message of Croft, as discussed at para. 104 
above. 
126. That approach is supported, in the circumstances of the present case by 
the evidence of Ms Nelson which the Judge recorded at para. 61 of his 
judgment, as follows: 
"Ms Nelson explained that the offer of counselling was not because 
she saw the claimant as particularly vulnerable or depressed but 
because the proceedings were likely to take some time. In later 
meetings with Mr Nelson the claimant expressed his feelings of anger 
and distress. He told her about his health, first, that he had been 
prescribed sleeping tablets and later, that he had been diagnosed with 
depression. Ms Nelson's evidence at trial was that in her position she 
saw many unhappy people, some more distressed than the claimant. 
The passing reference to sleeping tablets was nothing unusual. She said 
that the claimant's reactions were not an unusual response to 
investigations and disciplinary proceedings. She said that many people 
exhibited similar responses and that the vast majority did not develop 
depression. She knew of only two instances of psychiatric illness in her 
fifteen years in Health and Welfare at the FCO and they were 
different." 
The Judge summarised in a footnote the facts of the two cases referred to in 
the final sentence, about which he had been given some material, but he did 
not dispute Ms Nelson's evidence that their cases were different from the 
Claimant's, and it seems clear that they were; nor did he comment adversely 
on her evidence generally. Ms McNeill in her Respondent's Notice said that 
the Judge should have treated these two examples as positively supporting her 
case on foreseeability because they should have alerted the FCO to the effects 
on the mental health of senior employees of denying them natural justice. But 
it is the generality of Ms Nelson's experience that matters, and the evidence 
that many employees who had received similar setbacks were distressed and 
angry but that none had developed depression in my view supports the 
exceptionality of the Claimant's reaction. Ms Nelson was peculiarly well-
placed to give evidence of this kind, given the length of her experience in the 
FCO and the sympathy with the Claimant's predicament which is evident from 
what she wrote at the time. 
127. Against that background I have come to the conclusion that there was 
nothing about the circumstances of the present case sufficiently egregious to 
render it foreseeable that the Claimant's withdrawal from his post would cause 
him a psychiatric injury. I fully acknowledge that his withdrawal was a major 
setback to his career and was bound to cause distress and anger, exacerbated 
by the unfairness which the Judge found. But it was not tantamount to 
dismissal. Nor was it a disciplinary sanction or based on any established 
misconduct, as Ms Le Jeune made clear to him: he was being withdrawn 
because the making of the allegations made his position operationally 
untenable, not because they were being treated as established, which was to be 
the subject of a proper investigation. Ms Le Jeune told him that if he was 
exonerated by the investigation she would do her best to find him another 
posting. The FCO was evidently attempting to follow due process, 
notwithstanding the particular unfairness which the Judge found. This was not 
a case of some gross and arbitrary injustice of the kind alleged, for example, 
in Eastwood. In all those circumstances – and bearing in mind in particular Ms 
Nelson's evidence which I have set out above – I do not believe that the FCO 
should have foreseen, in the absence of any sign of special vulnerability, that 
the Claimant might develop a psychiatric illness as a result of its decision. 
128. That view gets some support from the medical evidence. The experts 
were asked whether, prior to June 2008, "it was reasonably foreseeable that 
the Claimant would develop a psychiatric disorder, and in particular 
depression". Dr Turner's response was straightforwardly that it was not. Dr 
Baggaley said that there were no factors to suggest prior vulnerability – "and 
therefore it follows that it was not reasonably foreseeable"; but he added that 
he thought that this was an issue for the Court. Having said that, I would not 
wish to treat that evidence as in any way decisive. The experts were entitled to 
say that there was nothing in the Claimant's history to suggest special 
vulnerability; but the question whether, on the findings of fact made, the 
FCO's conduct was such that it was nevertheless foreseeable that he might 
suffer psychiatric injury could only, as Dr Baggaley said, be decided by the 
Court. 
129. I have considered carefully whether this is a case where, although I 
might myself have reached a different conclusion, I can fairly say that the 
Judge's decision was wrong. But his decision was not one of primary fact, or 
indeed one of fact at all. Rather, it was a judgment – based, as I have said, 
inevitably on his own experience rather than on any medical or other evidence 
– as to the degree of likelihood that the Claimant would develop a depressive 
illness. This Court is as well placed to make that judgment as he was; and, 
having reached a different conclusion I am, I think, obliged to give effect to it. 
I am in fact the less reluctant to differ from the Judge because I think, with all 
respect, that he may have treated the decision in Gogay as having more 
authority, as regards this issue, than it does; and that is material because he 
clearly attached particular weight to that decision. In para. 137 of his judgment 
he describes this Court in Gogay as having held "that it was reasonably 
foreseeable that a knee-jerk reaction by employers in the implementation of 
disciplinary procedures, … might cause psychological damage". That was 
indeed the finding in the County Court (though I am uneasy about the equation 
of "psychological" with "psychiatric"); but, as I have shown above, this Court 
did no more than decline to interfere with the conclusion of the judge. We do 
not know on what basis that conclusion was established: in particular, there is 
no reason to suppose that it was not a case of known psychiatric vulnerability, 
and some reason to believe that it may have been. 
130. Although I have come to this conclusion squarely on the facts of the 
present case it is in line with the outcomes in Croft and Deadman and with the 
views of the Court of Appeal and of Lord Steyn in Johnson v Unisys – in all of 
which the claim for psychiatric injury failed because of the absence of any 
evidence of vulnerability on the part of the claimant. It true that in 
neither Croft nor (particularly) Deadman was the action taken as grave as that 
taken by the FCO in this case; but in Johnson the employee had been 
dismissed. 
131. I have not in reaching this conclusion attached weight to the fact that 
the Claimant was offered the support of the FCO's Health and Welfare 
Department following his withdrawal and during the disciplinary 
investigation. Such support is relevant in cases where the issue is whether 
employers should have foreseen the risk of psychiatric injury as a result of 
"ordinary" stress at work, but I doubt if it is material in a case of the present 
kind. 
132. I ought to mention for completeness that Ms McNeill in her oral 
submissions floated the suggestion that Bliss v South East Thames Regional 
Health Authority, to which I refer at para. 90 above, is no longer good law 
following the treatment of Addis v The Gramophone Company inJohnson v 
Unisys. In this connection she referred us to the decision of the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Honda Canada Inc v Keays [2008] SCC 39. But when pressed 
she disavowed any submission (which had not been raised in the Respondent's 
Notice) that if the Claimant's claim for damages for psychiatric injury failed 
on the grounds of remoteness he might recover damages for distress; and in 
those circumstances the point goes nowhere. 
133. I would accordingly hold that the Judge should have held that the 
losses attributable to the Claimant's psychiatric injury were not reasonably 
foreseeable and cannot accordingly found a claim for breach of the common 
law duty of care. It follows that they are also too remote to be recoverable in 
his claim for breach of contract, where the test of remoteness is more 
favourable to defendants. I would allow the FCO's appeal to that extent and 
remit the case to the High Court to decide quantum if the parties are unable to 
agree. 
(B) THE RESPONDENT'S NOTICE 
134. The Respondent's Notice challenges the Judge's reasoning under three 
headings. I take them in turn. 
(1) THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW ON OPERATIONAL GROUNDS 
135. The point as pleaded in the Respondent's Notice appears to be that on 
the true construction of the appointment letter withdrawal is only possible on 
grounds of poor performance. That would make very little sense, and I do not 
think that it is a fair construction of the terms of the letter: poorly drafted 
though it is, there is a clear reference to operational withdrawal as something 
separate from withdrawal following "the usual performance management 
processes". And the position is put beyond doubt by the terms of the 
Guidance. In her skeleton argument Ms McNeill put it rather differently. She 
argued that the withdrawal of the Claimant from his post on "operational" 
grounds was in breach of contract not only because it was unfair but also 
because the effect of the relevant contractual provisions was that an officer 
should only be withdrawn as a result of allegations of misconduct if those 
allegations had been considered under the disciplinary procedure and the 
misconduct had been established: it was impermissible in such a case to 
circumvent the contractual processes by labelling the withdrawal 
"operational". 
136. Since I would uphold the Judge's finding that the withdrawal was in 
breach of contract because it was unfair, this point is academic. However, 
since the point could conceivably arise in another case, I should say that I do 
not believe that Ms McNeill's submission is well-founded. I have set out at 
para. 11 above the provisions in paragraph 39 of the Guidance covering 
"misconduct" cases. These are clumsily drafted, and it is not entirely clear 
whether the bullets are cumulative or to be read separately. If the latter, then 
the third bullet precisely covers the present case: Ms Le Jeune had clearly 
formed the view that "regardless of the outcome of the investigation into 
allegations of misconduct, it would be untenable … for [the Claimant] to 
remain in post". But even if that has to be read as subject to the reference in 
the first bullet to "gross" misconduct (and assuming that it was already clear 
that any charges in the present case would only be at level 2), I do not believe 
that it follows that an operational withdrawal, under the provisions which I 
have also set out, is precluded: if the officer's position is untenable or there are 
other circumstances "sufficiently serious to warrant withdrawal" I do not think 
that it should make any difference that that is as a result of allegations of 
misconduct. That would be an unnecessarily legalistic reading of a working 
document, and of a provision which is plainly and understandably intended to 
preserve a wide power to withdraw officers from postings where that is judged 
necessary. 
(2) "MR GIFFORD'S INVESTIGATION" 
137. Although this section is headed "Mr Gifford's Investigation" it consists 
of three distinct paragraphs only one of which is in fact concerned with that 
investigation. What the three paragraphs have in common is that they 
challenge the Judge's refusal to find that the FCO's treatment of the Claimant 
subsequent to his withdrawal constituted a breach of contract or a breach of 
duty. Very broadly, what is said is that if Mr Gifford had carried out a better 
investigation and/or assessed its results properly he would have concluded that 
there was no case to answer on the sexual misconduct allegations, so that they 
would have failed at the first stage rather than the second (para. 3); (2) that the 
FCO's attitude to the Claimant over the whole history of the allegations 
against him – evinced partly but not only in the handling of the disciplinary 
process – was not impartial (para. 4); and (3) that Sir Peter Ricketts should 
have given substantive consideration to the Claimant's letter of 27 January 
2010 (para. 5). 
138. It is necessary to consider how those criticisms could affect the 
outcome of this appeal. They could, in principle, plainly do so if this Court 
were to uphold the FCO's appeal against the finding that the withdrawal itself 
was unfair: they would constitute a separate basis on which the claim might 
succeed. But if My Lords agree that that aspect of the FCO's appeal fails, their 
only other potential relevance is to foreseeability: what is contended under the 
third heading in the Respondent's Notice is that the FCO's various post-
withdrawal breaches (or failings which cumulatively comprise a breach) 
reinforce the case that it was foreseeable that the Claimant would suffer a 
psychiatric injury. However, I cannot accept that the matters sought to be 
raised could affect the outcome of the appeal in that regard. If, as I would 
hold, it was not foreseeable that the Claimant's unfair withdrawal from his 
post as High Commissioner would cause him a psychiatric injury, it is unreal 
to suggest that these further alleged breaches could lead to a different result. It 
was, plainly, the loss of his job that was the substantial blow to the Claimant: 
the other alleged unfairnesses – such as having the sexual misconduct 
allegations dismissed at the second stage of the process rather than the first – 
are of their nature secondary. 
139. It follows that the points which the Claimant seeks to raise under this 
head are academic. I do not think that I would be justified in lengthening this 
already lengthy judgment by dealing with them in any detail. However, in 
deference to Ms McNeill's submissions I will state my conclusions on them 
very shortly. 
140. As for para. 3, which concerned Mr Gifford's investigation, I would 
endorse the Judge's finding, at para. 129 of his judgment, that overall Mr 
Gifford's fact-finding report showed both diligence and thoroughness. There 
may be room for criticism of particular steps that he took or did not take, but 
only in a very exceptional case would I be prepared to find that good faith 
misjudgments by an investigator about how to proceed with an investigation 
could by themselves amount to breaches of the Malik term or any cognate 
term, or of the common law duty of care. Even if they were such as to render 
an eventual disciplinary decision unfair, it would be that decision that 
constituted the breach. Here of course the eventual decision was to dismiss the 
charge of sexual misconduct; and I do not think that it can constitute a breach 
that that occurred at the second stage of the process rather than the first. 
141. In support of the allegation of lack of impartiality in para. 4, the Notice 
not only refers to the matters complained of in the previous paragraph about 
Mr Gifford's investigation but raises a large number of other "incidents of 
inaccuracy, untruth and often admitted unfairness" between the date of Mr 
Evans' first report and his eventual retirement. Save for one point, Ms McNeill 
did not develop this aspect in her oral submissions, saying that she relied on 
her skeleton argument (which simply reproduces the contents of the 
Respondent's Notice). The one point which she developed concerned the 
FCO's conduct in relation to Mr Priestley's e-mail to Mr Wood of 7 July 2008 
(see para. 30 above). The Claimant was not initially told about the e-mail, but 
it was referred to in Mr Gifford's report of 17 July and he asked to see a copy. 
Mr Gifford was willing to show it to him but Mr Wood thought that this would 
be a breach of Mr Priestley's confidence and prior to the hearing of 7 August 
he was given only a redacted copy. The email was read to him at the hearing: 
he was unable to say whether it was read in full or in part. In the litigation the 
FCO declined to disclose an unredacted copy until shortly before the trial, 
after a witness summons had been served on Mr Priestley. While describing 
the FCO's refusal to disclose the e-mail as troubling, the Judge declined to 
treat the episode as impugning Mr Gifford's impartiality: see para. 130 of his 
judgment. I see nothing wrong in that conclusion. As he pointed out, Mr 
Gifford was himself willing to let the Claimant have a full copy, and the 
Claimant was given a full account of the evidence underlying the allegations 
against him. Even if the FCO is to be criticised for its subsequent reluctance to 
make full disclosure that has no bearing on the conduct of the process itself. 
That point apart, I need only say that none of the other particular incidents 
pleaded seems to me to demonstrate any lack of impartiality on the part of the 
decision-makers, and in particular of Mr Gifford. 
142. As for para. 5, in the Amended Particulars of Claim Sir Peter's failure 
"to give fair and proper consideration to the Claimant's [letter of 27 January 
2010]" is pleaded as one of some forty matters which are said cumulatively to 
constitute a breach of the Malik term (see para. 87 (ii)). The Judge does not 
address this complaint in his judgment. What is said in the Respondent's 
Notice is that if he had done so he would have been obliged to conclude that 
Sir Peter's failure to reply substantively (taken, it seems, with the 
shortcomings in the Gifford investigation pleaded at para. 3) constituted a 
breach of contract. I need only say that I can see nothing wrong in an 
employer, in circumstances where all formal procedures have been exhausted, 
declining to enter into further substantial correspondence with an employee 
who has instructed lawyers to obtain redress for him. 
(3) FORESEEABILITY AND BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE 
143. I have already dealt with the points raised in this paragraph: see para. 
138 above. 
(C) THE INTEREST APPEAL 
144. I set out the background at para. 4 above. Cranston J's reasons for 
awarding interest at 8% (less the rate obtainable by the Claimant's solicitors) 
are brief. He did not refer to any statutory provisions or authority but said 
simply that the effect of the arrangement under which the agreed award was to 
be held by his solicitors pending the outcome of any appeal deprived him of 
the use of his money. 
145. The FCO's pleaded grounds of appeal proceeded on the basis that the 
Judge's award was made under section 17 (1) of the Judgments Act 1838, 
which provides for payment at 8% "until the [judgment debt] shall be 
satisfied"; but that such an award was not open to him because payment to the 
Claimant's solicitors would satisfy the judgment debt. The Claimant's response 
was (a) that the FCO had conceded before the Judge that he had a discretion as 
to what rate to award, from which it should not be allowed to resile; but in any 
event that (b) the judgment debt had not been satisfied and that accordingly 
the judgment rate was payable, alternatively (c) that the Judge had a discretion 
as to what rate to award, which he had exercised properly. 
146. We were taken through the notes of the argument about interest before 
Cranston J, but I do not find it necessary to decide whether Mr Payne made 
the concession alleged since even if he did I do not think that it would be right 
to hold the FCO to it. The real question is whether the payment to the 
Claimant's solicitors constituted a satisfaction of the FCO's judgment debt. In 
my view it is plain that it did not. They did not hold the money to his order: on 
the contrary, they were bound not to release it to him pending the outcome of 
the appeal. The arrangement under which the payment was made was in 
substance an agreed form of stay of execution, reflecting the fact that the 
Claimant was not able to satisfy the FCO that if the appeal were successful he 
would be able to repay the damages awarded if they had been paid to him in 
the meantime. If the Claimant had been intransigent and the FCO had had to 
seek, and had obtained, a stay from the Court he would have been entitled to 
interest at the judgment rate if the appeal failed and the payment fell to be 
made at that point. It would be extraordinary if the sensible arrangement in 
fact made produced any different outcome. 
147. Once that point is reached it does not much matter whether the Judge's 
order was made under the 1838 Act or in the exercise of some distinct 
discretion: even if the latter were the case his exercise of his discretion was 
plainly unimpeachable. But in my view the former analysis is correct: in 
substance what he was deciding was that the agreed arrangement did not 
constitute satisfaction of the judgment debt, with the consequence that the 
judgment rate applied as of right. It was argued that that was inconsistent with 
the reduction of the rate to reflect any interest earned while the money was 
held by the solicitors: we were referred to authority to the effect that there is 
no jurisdiction to vary the judgment rate since it is set by statute. I am not sure 
that there is any substantive inconsistency: the arrangement could be one 
whereby the FCO paid the judgment rate but had a separate entitlement to be 
paid interest received. But the point does not need to be definitively resolved 
since there was no cross-appeal by the Claimant. 
CONCLUSION AND DISPOSAL 
148. I would dismiss the FCO's appeal against the findings of breach of 
contract and against the Judge's findings on causation. But I would allow its 
appeal on the issue of the remoteness of the claim for psychiatric injury and 
thus also against the finding of breach of the common law duty of care. I 
would remit the case to the Judge to decide quantum, in relation to the 
contractual claims, accordingly (unless it can be agreed in the meantime). I 
would dismiss the interest appeal. 
 
 ANNOTATIONS 
 
Yapp is an important decision of the English Court of Appeal for restating the law on 
psychiatric injury in employment. Lord Justice Underhill, giving the lead judgment, 
sets out five ‘propositions’ ‘with regards to the issues of foreseeability and 
remoteness’ (paragraph 119). The language of ‘propositions’ notably is reminiscent of 
Lady Justice Hale’s similarly titled ‘propositions’ previously in Hatton v Sutherland 
([2002] EWCA Civ 76, [2002] IRLR 263), also at Court of Appeal level. Hale LJ’s 
sixteen propositions were indeed repeated so often subsequently that Lord Walker in 
Barber v Somerset County Council ([2004] UKHL 13, [2004] IRLR 475) had to 
remind courts that these propositions did not have ‘statutory force’ (paragraph 65).  
 
The claim in Yapp was brought both in contract and tort. Although the majority of the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal focuses on issues of tort law (‘since the tortious test 
of remoteness is more favourable to claimants’: paragraph 21), it is also significant to 
note the reasoning of the earlier High Court ([2013] EWHC 1098 (QB), [2013] IRLR 
616) in Yapp on contract. Mr Justice Cranston in the High Court had found that there 
were two breaches of contract (first, unlawful withdrawal and, second, unlawful 
application of the disciplinary procedure). Admittedly, the Court of Appeal only 
upheld one of those findings of breach of contract: the first, unlawful withdrawal (as 
discussed at paragraphs 57-67). But the Court of Appeal did not disagree with the 
characterisation by Cranston J that the claimant had a contractual right to ‘fair 
treatment’ by his employer. This was as a result of an express term (Mr Yapp’s letter 
of appointment, perhaps rather unusually, explicitly stated that ‘As Head of Mission 
you are, of course, entitled to fair treatment…’: paragraph 82 of the High Court’s 
decision), but also and potentially of wider importance for employees generally, 
seemingly arose as a term implied in law. Cranston J had stated that the ‘duty of fair 
treatment can also be derived from the implied term of trust and confidence in the 
employer-employee relationship’ (paragraph 117 of the High Court’s decision). The 
implied term of mutual trust and confidence is, of course, itself a term implied by law 
(i.e. a ‘default’ term: Malik v BCCI SA [1997] IRLR 462, paragraph 53), with the 
effect that if the implied term of fair treatment is derived from it, surely the implied 
term of fair treatment will also be of the same ‘default’ character. When the case 
reached the Court of Appeal, Underhill LJ did not disagree that there was an implied 
right to fair treatment: simply commenting in parenthesis ‘though such a duty would 
no doubt have been implied in any event’ (paragraph 41). This may be important if 
subsequent cases pick up on and develop the observations by the High Court in Yapp 
equating ‘fair treatment’ with principles of ‘natural justice’ (paragraphs 82 and 131).  
 
The bulk of the judgment of the Court of Appeal deals with the separate issue as to 
whether it was ‘reasonably foreseeable’ that the claimant would develop a psychiatric 
illness. Remoteness was dealt with under the heading of ‘damages for breach’ by the 
High Court. However, as noted by the Court of Appeal, remoteness and foreseeability 
were important at the earlier stage of liability (thereby reflecting the difference if 
concentrating on the claim in contract or in tort): ‘because if the risk of psychiatric 
injury is too remote no duty to take steps to avoid it will arise, and there can thus be 
no question of breach’ (paragraph 58). Unlike the High Court, the Court of Appeal 
finds that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the claimant would react in the way 
he did, developing a depressive illness. Underhill LJ states ‘… it is exceptional that an 
apparently robust employee, with no history of any psychiatric ill health, will develop 
a depressive illness as a result even of a very serious setback at work’ (paragraph 
125). In stark comparison, Cranston J had found ‘[t]he claimant had an ostensible 
robustness but... To my mind it could reasonably be contemplated when the claimant 
was appointed as high commissioner in 2007 that depression would be a not unlikely 
result of a knee-jerk withdrawal from post’ (paragraph 137). Although not in itself 
foreseeable before the event, as an example of the experience Mr Yapp had endured, 
Cranston J also referred to adverse media coverage of his withdrawal (paragraph 58). 
 
Brodie has commented on the decision in Yapp (‘Risk Allocation and Psychiatric 
Harm: Yapp v Foreign and Commonwealth Office’ (2015) 44 Industrial Law Journal 
270-280), observing that the Court of Appeal draws together two different lines of 
cases: first, on (continuing) occupational stress and, second, on ‘one-off act[s] of 
serious and career-threatening unfairness’ (page 275). This is as a result of Underhill 
LJ’s five ‘propositions’ drawing upon cases such as Hatton and Barber (occupational 
stress cases) at proposition one as well as ‘Croft and Deadman (also Grieves)’ at 
proposition two (‘one-off act of unfairness such as the unfair imposition of a 
disciplinary sanction’): paragraph 119. Brodie criticises this assimilation, as one set of 
cases (Hatton and occupational stress) are ‘premised on the basis that some things are 
no one's fault’ whereas, the other set of cases, ‘badly handled disciplinary processes 
are properly the subject of criticism and arguably should lead to liability’ (page 275). 
 
In his discussion of the previous cases, Underhill LJ refers to the ‘principle’ that ‘in 
the absence of some particular known problem or vulnerability an employer is entitled 
to assume that his employees are persons of ordinary fortitude’ (paragraph 117). Then 
when reversing the trial judge’s decision on foreseeability, Underhill LJ stresses the 
need, ‘usually’, for a ‘sign of special vulnerability’ (paragraph 127, but also paragraph 
123, paragraph 128 and proposition one at paragraph 119) before an employer will be 
held be liable for psychiatric illness caused in employment. (Indeed, in a shorter 
concurring judgment, Davis LJ states ‘I was in some ways attracted to the view that, 
in the context of a breach of duty of care (whether contractual or tortious) of the 
present kind in an employment context which is said to have resulted in psychiatric 
injury, any such injury is always to be regarded as not reasonably foreseeable/too 
remote unless the employer was, or should have been, already aware of some relevant 
susceptibility or vulnerability on the part of the employee’: paragraph 154 and 
emphasis in original). One possible line of subsequent enquiry might be to question 
whether the judicial perception of an employee of ‘ordinary fortitude’ needs updating, 
if medically diagnosed incidents of depression at work in the contemporary workplace 
are on the increase. Alternatively, perhaps the Court of Appeal overstepped its 
boundaries by interfering with Cranston J’s findings on this question essentially of 
fact (see Davis LJ at paragraph 156: ‘Questions of remoteness are questions requiring 
a factual assessment and evaluative judgment on the part of a trial judge in the 
particular circumstances of a particular case’ and also Underhill LJ at paragraph 122). 
 
In an often quoted passage from Spring v Guardian Assurance [1994] IRLR 460, 
Lord Slynn commented that ‘it is relevant to consider the changes which have taken 
place in the employer/employee relationship, with far greater duties imposed on the 
employer than in the past, whether by statute or by judicial decision, to care for the 
physical, financial and even psychological welfare of the employee’ (paragraph 86). 
From the perspective of tort law and its development of protection of the 
‘psychological welfare’ of employees, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Yapp may be 
seen as somewhat of a disappointment. In comparison, the High Court’s decision in 
Yapp on contract law may be seen as a more promising development for employees 
generally, subject to what extent this too has been cut back by the Court of Appeal. 
 
A more detailed analysis of the decision by the Court of Appeal in Yapp can be found 
at: Douglas Brodie, ‘Risk Allocation and Psychiatric Harm: Yapp v Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office’ (2015) 44 Industrial Law Journal 270-280. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
